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''? - Lct & now examine the concrete , data illustrating cbc 
&m&es in the international situation. 
1. NEW ECONOMIC CRISI~ IN THE CARLTALIST COUNTRIES. INTEN= 
FEGATION OF THE STRUGGLE F'OR AUlUWIS AND S O U R ~ S  6s 
RAW MATEE&& AND FOR A NEW REDIVISION OF THE WOIUS 
The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist coun- 
tries in the latter half of lgng lasted until the end of 1933. 
- After that the crisis passed into a d&ression, and wiu then 
, fallowed by a certain revival, a certain upward trend of indn 
try. But this upward vend of industry did not develop into r 
boom, as is usually the case in a period of revival. On dp 
( !' 
. c o n m y  in the latter half of 1937 a new economic aisis begnq 
v ,  ,..., 
. A  
which seirnl the Unirted States fint of all and then England, 
, -  e . Bran& and a number of other countries. , #  
5 fLb The capitalist countrim thus found themselves faced with '. 
I;I', a new economic-crisis before they had even recovered kok 
Y,' ' tlre ravages of tbe recent one. 
b This &cumstance naturally led to an increase of unemp10y- 
:P ment: The number of unemployed in capitalist c o n n ~ s  
., which had fallea .from thirty million in sggg to fourieen 
I . - *  ' 
r. ' million in 1937, has now again rism to eighteen million p a 
8;'. , ': . . ksult'of the new economic &isis. . 
3 
5 :  A distinguishing feature of the new crisis is that it &&m 
n * 
- '  . i~ ,many respects from the pleeeding one, and, moreover, 
~1.. - d S e m  far the worn and not foy the better. p; - Fhtly, the new crisis; did not begin after an indus* 
. u was the case in ~gng, but after a depression tnd a . - 
:I;-. ~eviv& which, however, did not develop into a boom. 
This meam that tlie present crisis will be more sevm nnd b;.. 
; '. moir difEcult ro copewi@ thari the previous crisis. 
!s- ; : . Furrhec, the present d s  has broken out not in time -bf 
- peace, but at a time-when 1 second imperialist war has a h 4 7  
- been; at. a time when Japan, already in the second year of b her war with China, is disorganizing the immense Chinarc '3' - .. ' '+ . market and is renderirig it balmoft inaccessible to the goods of 
5; jt;', 6 
pi:..;: 
other countries; when Italy and Gcnnany have already placed 
their national economy on a war footing, squandering their 
reserves of raw material and foreign currency for this purpose; - 
and when all the other big capitalist powers are beginning to 
reorganize themselves on a war footing. This means that capi- 
talism will have far less resources at its disposal for a normal 
way out of the present crisis than during the preceding crisis. 
Lastly, as distinct from the preceding crisis, the present 
aisis is not a general one, but as yet involves chiefly the 
economically powerful countries which have not yet placed 
themselves on a war economy basis. As regards the aggressive 
countries, such as Japan, Germany and Italy, which have 
already reorganized theit economy on a war footing, they, 
because of the intense development of their war industry, are 
not yet experiencing a crisis of overproduction, although they 
are approaching it. This means that by the time the economi- 
cally powerful, non-aggressive countries begin to emerge from 
the phase of crisis the aggressive countries, having exhausted 
their reserves of gold and raw material in the course of the 
war fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe crisis. 
This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the figures for 
the visible gold reserves of the capitalist countries: 
VISIBLE GOLD RESERVES OF THE CmITALIST COUNTRIES 
(In millions of former gold dollars) 
End of September 
1936 1938 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Total 12,980 
USA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69649 
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2,029 
France . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 97% 
Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  289 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Belgium . 373 
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  387 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Germany 16 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123 
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  273 
This table show that the combined gold reserves of Ger- 
7 
many, Italy andL~apan are less than the reserves of Switzerlanda 
-- alone. 
Here are a few figures illustrating the state of crisis of indus- 
a r y  in the capitalist countries during the past five years and the 
. tren& of industrial progress in the U.S.S.R.: 
VOLUME OF INDU!TIRIAL OUTPUT COMPARED WITH 1949 - 
1934 1935 '936 1937 '938 
I b (1929 = loo) 
USA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  : . . . .  . . .  664 75.6 88.1 90.3 70.0 
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98.8 105.8 . 115.9 123.7 "0.0 
Franoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71.0 67.4 79.3 82.8 70.0 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80.0 93.8 87.5 99.6 96.0 
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79.8 gqn 106.3 417.2 - 105.0 
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  108.7 141.8 151.1 170.8 165.0 
USS.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  238*3 29394 380.8 434.0 47'7.0 
This table shows that the Soviet Union is the only country 
in the world where crises are unknown and where industry is 
continuously on the upgrade. 
This table also shows that a serious economic crisis has 
already begun and is developing in the United States, Great 
Britain and France. 
Further, this table shows that in Italy and Japan, which 
placed their national economy on a war footing earlier than 
Germany, the downward course of industry already began 
in 1938. 
Lastly, this table shows that in Germany, which reorganized 
its economy on a war footing later than Italy and japan, 
industry is still experiencing a certain upward trend-although 
a small one, it is true-corresponding to that which took place 
in Japan and Italy until recently. 
There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen . 
occurs, Geman industry must enter the same downward path 
as Japan and Italy have already taken. For what does placing 
the economy of a country on a war footing mean?'It means 
giving industry a one-sided, war direction; developing to the 
utmost the production of goods necessary for war and not for 
8 
consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost 
the production and, especially, the sale of articles of general' 
consumption-and, consequently, reducing consumption by 
the population and confronting the country with an eco- 
nomic crisis. 
Such is the concrete picture of the treid of the new eco- 
' nomic crisis in the capitalist countries. 
Naturally, such an unfavorable turn of economic affairs 
could not but aggravate relations between the powers. The 
preceding crisis had already mixed the cards and intensified 
the struggle for markets and sources of raw materials. The 
seizure of Manchuria and North China by Japan, the seizure 
of Ethiopia by Italy-all this reflected the acuteness of the 
struggle among the powers, The new economic crisis must 
lead, and 'is actually leading, to a further sharpening of the 
imperialist struggle. It is no longer a question of competition 
in the markets, of a commercial war, of dumping. These 
methods of struggle have long been recognized as inadequate. . 
It is now a question of a new redivision of the world, of 
spheres of influence and colonies, by military action. 
Japan tried to justify her aggressive actions by the argument 
that she had been cheated when the Nine-Power Pact was con- 
cluded and had not been allowed to extend her territory at 
the expense of China, whereas Britain and France possess 
enormous colonies. Italy recalled that she had been cheated 
during the division of the spoils after the first imperialist war 
and that she must recompense herself at the expense of the 
spheres of influence of Britain and France. Germany, which 
had suffered severely as a result of t&e first imperialist war and * 
the Peace of Versailles, joined forces with Japan and Italy, 
and demanded an extension of her territory in Europe and 
the return of the colonies of which the victors in the first 
imperialist war had deprived her. I 
Thus the bloc of three aggressor states came to be formed. 
A new redivision of the world by means of war became 
imminent. . 
' 7: . . , . , 
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-M - qn AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICU SITUATIOrJ, 
COLLAPSE OF THE POST-WAR SYSTEM OF PEACE TREATIES. 
BEGINNING OF A NEH IMPERIALBT WAR 
Herk is a list of the most important events during the period 
under review, which mark the beginning of the new imperialist-, 
war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Ethiopia. In the summa 
of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in 
Spain, Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain and 
in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of ,Spain and in 
the hlearic Islands. Having seized Manchuria, Japan in 1937 
invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin 
and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from 
the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized 
Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten region of 
Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan seized Canton, and 
at the beginning of lggg the Island of Hainan. 
Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the 
nations, has drawn more than five hundred million people 
into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a v a ~  
territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and - Canton, 
through Ethiopia, to Gibraltar. 
After the first imperialist war the victor states, primarily 
Britain, France and the United States, set up a new regime in 
the relations between countries, the post-war regime of peace. 
The main props of this regime were the ~ine-power Pact in 
the Far East, and the Versailles Treaty and a number of other 
treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was set up to regu- 
late relations between countries within the framework of this 
regime,. on the basis of a united front of states, of collective 
defense of the security of states. However, three aggressive 
states, and the new imperialist war launched by them, have 
upset the entire system of this post-war peace regime. Japan 
tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and Italy the 
Versailles Treaty. In order to have their hands free, these three 
states withdrew from the League of Nations. 
The new imperialist war became a fact. 
1 0  
nge straight idto war without regard for treaties of my 
or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this 
1. So do the fascist rulers. That is why the fascist rulers 
before plunging into war, to frame public opinion t 
uit their ends, that is, to mislead, to deceive it. 
A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the inte 
f England and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a 
loc! "We" h a ~ e  no military bloc All "we" have is an innocu 
ous "Berlin-Rome axis"; that is, just a geometrical equati 
for an axis. (Laughter.) 
A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against 
terests of the Unittd States, Great Britain and France in 
Far East? Nothing of the kind! "We" have no military bloc. 
All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; 
at is, a slight penchant for geometry. (General laughter.) 
A war against the interests of England, France, the United 
Nonseruc! 'We*' are waging war on the C~mintern, 
t h e  states., If you don't believe it, read the "antiCom- 
ntern pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan. 
That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing 
ublic opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposter- 
s the whole clumsy game bf camouflage was; for it is ridi 
s to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts 
ongolia, in the mountains of Ethiopia, or in the wil 
panish Morocco. (Laughter.) 
But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under 
r no "axes," "triangles" or "antiComintern pacts" can 
the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stret 
territory in China, that Italy has seized Ethiopia, that 
many has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Ge 
and Italy together have seized Spain-and all this i 
of the interests of the non-aggressive states. The war 
war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; 
the aggressors remain aggressors. 
is a distinguishing feature of ' the new imperialist war that 
it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being ' 
waged by aggressor states, which in every way infringe upon 
the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, 
France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, . 
making concession after concession to the aggressors. 
Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and 
spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive 
, states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a 
certain amount of connivance, on the part of the latter. 
Incredible, but me.  
T o  what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange , 
character of the new imperialist war? 
How is it that the non-ag@essive countries, which possess , 
such vast opportunities, have so easily, and without any re- 
sistance, abandoned their position and their obligations to 4 
plkase the aggressors? . 
Is it-to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive 1 
states? Of course not l Combined, the non-aggressive, dem& 
aatic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, 
both economically and militarily. 
, 
T o  what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions 
made by these states to the aggressors? 
It might be atmbuted, for exainple, to the fear that a .revo- ' 
lution might break out if the non-aggressive states were tv gm . 
to war and the war were to assume world-wide proportions. -, 
The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imlje 
rialist world war led to the victory of the revolution in one d . 
the largest countries. They are afraid that the second imperial- I. 
ist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in , 
one or several muptrieJ. 
But at present this is not the sole or even the chief reason. . 
The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive 
countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the ' 
policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistanw . 
to the aggressom, and, have'. taken up a position of non-intet? 
ven tlon, a p i t i o n  of "new trali ty." '3 ' ' L  I , > %  . .-c r , , f < , ' r -  2 
I2 1, ' . 
4 ' 1  * 
Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might 
defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from LU 
aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. 
We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their vic- 
tims." But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention 
means conniving at aggression, giving free reign to war, and, 
consequently, ~ansfoming the war into a world war. The 
policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not 
to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work, not to hinder 
Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, 
better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, 
say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroil- 
ing herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the 
belligerents to sink deeply into the mire )of war, to encourage 
them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and 
exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak 
enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, 
of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions 
to the enfeebled belligerents. 
Cheap and easy! 
Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before 
Japan invaded North China all the influential French and 
British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her 
inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her 
army could subjugate China in  two or three months. Then 
the European and American politicians began to watch and 
wait. And then, when Japan started military operations, they 
let her have Shanghai, the vital center of foreign capital in 
China; they let her have Canton, a center of Britain monopoly 
influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they 
allowed her to surround Hongkong. Does not this look very 
much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though-they 
were saying: "Embroil yourself deeper in war; then we 
shall see." 
Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, 
despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they lei 
- ,  
,:: $ 
. ' ber have 'the Sudeten region; they abandoned Cachdovakia 
to h a  fate, thereby violating- all their obligations; and then 
they began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weak* 
nes  of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian 
air force," and "riotsss in the Soviet Union, egging the Ger- 
mans on to march further east, promising them easy pickings, 
and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and 
everything will be all right." ft must be admitted that this too 
looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor. 
The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American 
press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen 
of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the 
Germans were marching on Soviet ~kraine,  that they now had 
what is called the cha th ian  Ukraine, with a population of 
some seven hundred thousand, and that not. later than this 
spring the Germans would mndr the Soviet Ukraine, which 
has a population of more than thirty million, to this so-called 
Carpathian Ukraine. It lootr as if the object of this suspicious 
hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, 
' to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Ger- 
many. without any visible grounds. 
It is quite possible, -of coune, that there ue madmen in 
Gennany who dream of annexing elephant, that is, the 
Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian 
Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest 
assured that we shall find enough strait-jackets for them in our 
country. (Thunderous applause.) But if we ignore the mad- 
men and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and 
foolish seriously to talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this 
so-called Carpathian Ullraine?- Imagine: The gnat comes to 
the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother, how sorry I am 
for ypu. . . . Here you are without any landlords, without any 
capitalists, with no national oppression, without any fascist 
bosses. Is that a way to live? . . . As I look at you I canst help 
thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yuur- 
self to me. . . . (Gerrcral laughter-) Well, M, be it: I allow you 
'4 
to annex your tiny domain to my vast territories. . . . +'m 
era1 laughter and applause.) 
Even more characteristic. is the fact that certain European 
and American mliticians and newsr>aDer writers, havim lost 
patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are 
themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the 
policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly. put- 
ting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly 
"disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east, 
against the Soviet Union, they have turned to the west, you 
I see, and are demanding colonies. One might think that the 
districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the 
price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, 
but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and 
sending them to Hades. 
Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intemen- 
tion, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive 
to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. 
Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeoib diplo- 
mats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dan-. 
gerous political game started by the supporters of the policy 
of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them. 
Such is the true face of the prevailing policy of non- 
intervention. 
Such is the political situation in the capitalist countries. 
3. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
The war has created a new situateion with regard to the re- 
lations between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmos- 
phere of alarm and uncertainty. By undermining the post-war 
peace regime and overriding the elementary principles of in- 
ternational law, it has cast doubt on the value, of international 
treaties and obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes 
are dead and buried. Feverish arming has taken their place, 
Everybody is arming, small states and big states, including 
prharily those which practise the policy of non-intervention. 
' F ~ & ~ ~ ~ i ~ - ~ , -  :'. - -',' 1, 
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'2. :-, . w & ~  believes any longer in the unctuous speeches which $? :.. 
@+; , 
: daim that the Munich concessions to the aggresso~~ and the 
L C 1 .  
, . 
Munich agreement opened a new era of "appeasement." They 
, - are disbelieved even by the signatories to the Munich agree- : 
'r .anent, Britain and France, which are increasing their arma- . 
ments no less than other countries. 
Naturally, the U.S.S.R. could not ignore these ominous 
events. There is no doubt that any war, however small, started 
by the aggressors in any remote corner of the world constitutes 
a danger to the peaceable countries. All the more serious then 
is the danger arising from the new imperialist war, which has 
already drawn into its orbit more than five hundied million 
people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of this, while our 
country is unswervingly pursuing a policy of preserving pea&, 
it is at the same time doing a great deal to increase the pre- 
paredness of our Red Army and our Red Navy. 
At the same time, in order to strengthen its international 
position, the soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. 
At the3nd of 1934 our country joined the League of ~ations, 
,considering that despite -its weakness the League might never- 
theless serve as a place where,aggressors can be exposed, and 
a certain instrument of peace, howewr feeble, that might 
hinder the outbreak of war. The .Soviet Union considers -that 
in alarming times like these even so weak 'an international 
organiiation as the League of Nations should not be ignored. ' 
In May, 1935, a treaty of mutual assistance against possible ' 
attack b). aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet 
Union. A, similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with 
~~echoslovakia. In March, 1936; the Soviet Union concluded 
a treaty of tnutual assistance with the Mongolian People's 
Republic In August, 1937, the Soviet Union conduded a pact 
of non-aggression with the Chinese Republic 
It was in such diflicuIt international conditions .that the 
Soviet Union its foreign policy of upholding the 
k a w  of peace. 
The foreie policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explid~:~ . . . 
1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of busi- 
ness relations with all countries. That is our position; . 
and we shall adhere to this position as long as these coun- 
tries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and 
as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the inter- 
ests of our country. 
n. We stand for peaceid, close and friendly relations 
with all the neighboring countries which have common 
frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we 
shall adhere to this position as long as these countries 
maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long 
as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, 
on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the 
Soviet state. 
3. We stand for the support of nations which are the 
victims of aggression and are fighting for the indepen- 
dence of their country. 
4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and 
are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by 
instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet 
borders. . 
Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. (Loud and 
prolonged applause.) 
In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon: 
1. It growing economic, political and cultural might; 
2. The moral and political unity of our Soviet society; ' 
3. The mutual friendship of the nations of our 
country; 
4. Its Red Army and Red Navy; 
5. Its policy of peace: 
6. The moral support of the workin people of all 
countries, who are vitally concerned in e preservation 
of peace; 
7. The good sense of the countries which for one rea- 
son or another have no interest in the violation of peace. 
# # # 
The tasks of the Party in the sphere of-foreign policy are: 
# 
1. T o  continue the policy of peace and of strengthen- 
ing business relations with all countries; 
e. To be cautious and not allow our country to be 
17 

11. Internal AfTairs of the Soviet Union 
ET US now pass to the internal a£Eairs of our country. L From the standpoint of its internal situation, the Soviei 
Union, during the period under review, presented a picture 
of further progress of its entire economic life, a rise in culture, 
and the strengthening of the political might of the country. 
In the sphere of economic development, we must regard 
the most important result durilig the period under review to 
be the fact that the reconstruction of industry and agriculture 
on the basis of a new, modern technique has been completed. 
There are no more or hardly any more old plants in our 
country, with their old technique, and hardly any old peas- 
ant farms, with their antediluvian equipment. Our industry 
and agriculture are now based on new, up-todate technique. 
It may be said without exaggeration that from the standpoint 
of the technique of production, from the standpoint of the 
degree of saturation of industry and agriculture with new 
machinery, our country is more advanced than any other coun- 
try, where the old machinery acts as a fetter on production 
and hampers the introduction. of modem technique. 
In the sphere of the social and political development of the 
country, we must regard the most important achievement 
during the period under review to be the fact that the rem- 
nants of the exploiting classes have been completely elirnin- 
Sted, that the workers, peasants and intellectuals have been 
welded into one common front of the working people, that 
the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been 
strengthened, that the friendship among the nations of our 
country has become closer, and, as a result, that the political 
life of our Country has been completely democratized and a 
new Constitution created. No one will dare deny that our 
19 
atitution is the most democratic in the world, and that 
: rhults of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the 
B U.S.S.R., as well as to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Re- 
!/ 
2a 
.been the most exemplary. 
result of all this is a completely stable internal situa-. - 
a stability of government which any other govern- , 
&@ent in the world might envy. 
$:I Let us examine the concrete data illustrating the economic 
kand political situation of our country. 
FURTHER PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE 
Zndwtrv. During the ~eriod under review oar industry 
/ 
picture 
. not on 
ly, in t 
. U A , 
of uninterrupted progress. This progress 
ly in an increase of output generally, but, 
.he flourishing state of socialist industry, 
%on the one hand, and the doom of private industry, on the ,i 
is a table which illustrates this: 
INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1934-38 1 ..j 
1933 1934 1935 '936 9 3  '938 
In millions of rubles at 1926-27 prices 
$Total output . . . . . qn,ogo 50477 62,137 80,gng 90,166 mo,375 
w+ 
Of which: 
*e gzii L. Sodalist industry qn,mr 5 0 4 3  62.1 14 80,898 90,138 ~00,349 dmn 1 %WP, Private indusw . 28 %A s s 8 1 28 " * " - 
sg,k 
Per cent of @-mious year - it 
(-p . y  
!?Total output . . . . . 
. ~t - i a  
:& a, Socialist industry 
o. Private industry. 
Per cent 
Total output . . . . . 1oo.m 100.00 m0.w 1oo.m ~oo.oo 1oo.00 
Of which: 
1.Socialist industry 99-93 99.93 99.96 99-96 99.97 99.97 
n. Private industrv. 0.07 0.07 0.04 O.OA 0.0% 0.0% 
that during the pe+xl under review the 
output of our indus* more than doubled, and that, more- 
over, the whole increase in output was accounted for by so- 
cialist industry. 
Further, this table shows that the only system of industry 
in the U.S.S.R. is the socialist system. 
Lastly, this table shows that the complete ruin of private 
industry is a fact which even a blind man cannot now deny. 
The ruin of private industry must not be regarded as a 
thing of chance. Private industry perished, first, because the a 
socialist economic system is superior to the capitalist system; 
and, second, because the socialist economic system made it 
possible for us in a few years to reequip the d o l e  of our 
socialist industry on new and up-to-d=te technical lines. This 
is a possibility which the capitalist economic system does not' 
and cannot offer. It is a fact that, from the standpoint of the 
technique of production and from the standpoint of the de- 
gree of saturation of industry with modem machinery, our 
industry holds h t  place in the world. 
If we take.the rate of growth of our industry, expressed in 
percentages of the prewar level, and compare it with the rate 
of growth of the industry of the principal capitalist countries, 
we get the following picture: f 
GROWTH OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE PRINCIPAL 
CAPTALIST COUNTRIES IN 1913-38 
9 3  '933 1934 1985 1936 1937 1938 
. . . . . . . . . . .  US3.R. loo 380.5 457.0 562.6 732.7 816.4 908.8 
- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  USA. loo 108.7 112.9 128.6 149.8 156.9 ~ m . o  
. . . . . . .  Great Britain loo 87.0 97.1 104.0 114.2 121.g 113.3 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Germany loo 75.4 90.4 105.9 118.1 rgg.3 131.6 
Ftance . . . . . . . . . . . .  loo 107.0 99.0 gq.0 98.0 101.0 g3.z 
This table shows that our industry has grown more than' 
ninefold ash compared with pre-war, whereas the industry of 
the principal capitalist countries continues to mark time 
ards technique of production and, 
ry, we have already overtaken and 
' 
itaiist countries. 
ng? We are still lagging eco- . 
ther: in ig$3 Great . 
and about mg,ooo,- 
as the U.S.S.R. pro. 
; . d u d  18,ooo,ooo tonsof steel and more than gg,ooo,ooo,aw, 
Wowatt-how of electricity* It might seem that 6e are better 
' atf than Great ~ritain. But if we divide this number of tons 
- and irilow~tt-hours by the number of population we shall find ', 
' rhat in 1938 in Great Britain the output of steel per head 
of p~pulation was 226 kilograms and of electricity 620 kilo- 
.: wate~hciur~, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the output of steel per 
only 233 kilowatt-hours. 
, . 'That is the reason fo r  this? The reason is that our p p u -  
. &tion is several times larger than that of Great Britain, and. ' 
" ' beace our requirements are greater: the Soviet Union has % a 
.; p~pulatidn of ifa,jo,ooo,oqo, whereas Great Britain has a popu-, 
' 
latian of not more than 46,000,ooo. The economic power of 
ssed by the volume of indus- 
frid output in general, irrespective of the size of population, 
' h t  by the volume of industrial output taken in direct ref=- 
, (+ik'-'43;8."$:a - !:,.#; p." ' -  .. , ;, . .* 9.t - . t .-.J'b, *, . - .  
i > $,- ' :  -, , < - *  .,. - 2 - . . , .,. t i  
1 . 8 .  < . * ' ( 1  ' 
i L  
larger a count;y's industrial output 'per head 
the greater 4s its economic power; and, conven 
the output * per head -of population, the less 
power of the country and of its industry. Consequently, the' I ,  
I t -' 
larger a country's population, the greater is the need for ar- $4;: 
tides of consumption, and hence the larger should be the 
. . 
industrial output of the country. < a  , , r :  
Take, for example, the output of pig iron. In order to ,-;.I 
outgVip Great Britain economically in respect to the produc-. rj 
tion of pig iron, which in 1938 amounted in that country to 
7 , m , m  tons, we must increase our annual output of pig , ,-- 
, J \ #  
iron to 25,ooo,ooo tons. In order economically to outstrip Ger-. . . . 
" , 
many, which in 1938 produced 18,000,ooo tons of pig iron in +.: 
all, we must raise our annual output to 40,000,000 or 45,000,- a', ;,;; 
ooo tons. And in order to outstrip the U.S.A. economically- . 
not as regards the level of 1938, which was a year of crisis, , ,,. 
and in which the U.S.A. produced only 18,800,ooo tons of pig 1: 
iron, but as regards the level of igng, when the U.S.A. was 
< .  
experiencing an industrial boom and when it produced about , , ,;:,
43,wo,ooo tons of pig iron-we must raise our annual output' ';.-i 
of pig iron to 50,000,ooo or 6o,mo,mo tons. ' - ' 3  
-; 2
The same must be said of the production of steel a@ rolled. , ' h  : 
! ' steel, of the macbinc-building industry, and so on, inasmuch- .. - ,-{ 
as all these bran&es of industry, like the other branches, de- ' ,-:; 
pend in the long run on the production of pig iron. " st (4 
*, --I; 
We have outstripped the' principal capitalist countries as , ; 
regards technique of production and rate of induspial de-: "..-* 
- '  IU 
velopment. That is very good, but. it is not enough. We must , . -' 3 outstrip them economically as well. We can do it, and we must -+, 
do it. Only if we outstrip the principal capitalist countries F.:; 
economically can we reckon upon our country being fully sat- 7" 
-, {ig 
' urated with consumers' goods, on having an abundance of - ;$ I 5r products, and on being able to make the transitio~ from the 
$; 
first phase- of communism' to its second phase. 
What do we require to outstrip the principal 
; countries emnomically? Fint of 
. 8 
, . r .  
I : . , - #  . ' A;,,: ., . - . . , . I  L . . .  , I . . 
I 
and indomitable desire to move ahead and the readiness to 
' make sacrifices and invest very considerable amounts of capi- 
tal for the utmost expansion of our socialist industry. Have 
- we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Further, we require 
: a high technique of production and a high rate of industrial 
. development. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have. 
; Lastly, we require time. Yes, comrades, time. We must build 
1 . new factories. We must train new cadres [personnel-Tr.] for 
industry. But this requires time, and no little time at that. We 
cannot outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically 
in two or three years. It will require rather more than that. 
Take, for example, pig iron and its production, to which 
we have already referred. How much time do we require to 
' outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in re- 
kard to the production of pig iron? When the Second Five- 
Year Plan was being drawn up, certain members of the old per- 
sonnel of the State Planning Commission proposed that the an- 
nual output of pig iron towards the end of the period of the 
Second Five-Year Plan should be fixed in the amount of sixty 
million tons. That means that they assumed the possibility of an 
average annual increase in pig iron production of ten million 
tons. This, of course, was sheer fantasy, if not worse. Inciden- 
tally, it was not only in regard to the production of pig iron 
that these comrades indulged their fantasy. They considered, 
d + 
, for example, that during the period of the Second Five-Year 
L 
Plan the annual increase of population in the U.S.S.R. should 
amount to three or four million persons, or even more. This 
t was also fantasy, if not worse. But if we ignore these fantastic 
dreamers and come down to reality, we may consider quite 
feasible an average annual increase in the output of pig iron 
. of two or two and a half million tons, bearing in mind the 
, ' present state of the technique of iron smelting. The industrial 
+ history of ihe principal capitalist countries, as well as of our 
country, shows that such an annual rate of increase involves 
' ". a great strain, but is quite feasible. - -'I 
;+- 
, 7: Hence, we require time, and no little time at that, in order 
to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically. And 
the higher our productivity of labor b e c o ~ s ,  and the more 
our technique of production is perfected, the more rapidly 
can we accomplish this cardinal economic task, and the more 
a n  we reduce the period of its accomplishment. 
B. Agriculture. Like the development of industry, the de- 
velopment of agriculture during the period under review has 
followed an upward trend. This upward trend is expressed 
not only in an increase of agricultural output, but, and pri- 
marily, in the growth and consolidation of socialist agriculture 
on the one hand, and the utter decline of individual peasant 
farming on the other. Whereas the grain area of the collective 
farms increased from 75,000,ooo hectares in iggg to 92,000,000 
in 1938, the grain area of the individual peasant farmers 
dropped in this period from i ~ , ~ o o , w o  hectares to 600,ooo 
hectares,* or to 0.6 per cent of the total grain area. I will not 
mention the area under industrial crops, a bran* where in- 
, dividual peasant farming has been altogether ousted. Further- 
more, it is well known that the collective farms now unite 
18,8m,om peasant households, or 93.5 per cent of all the 
peasant households, aside from the collective fisheries and col- 
lective trapping and handicraft industries. 
This means that the collective farms have been firmly es- 
tablished and consolidated, and that the socialist system of 
farming is now our only form of agriculture. 
If we compare the areas under all crops during the period 
under review with the crop areas in the pre-revolutionary 
period, we observe the following picture of growth: 
AREAS UNDER ALL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R. dm- %g 2 
'913 '934 '935 '936 '937 1938 8 -8  
Millions of hectares i% k 
8- 
Totalcroparea . . .  105.0 131.5 132.8 133.8 135.3 136.9 180.4 
Of which: 
a. Grain . . . . . . 94.4 104.7 103.4 102.4 104.4 102.4 108.5 
b. Industrial . . 4.5 10.7 10.6 10.8 11.2 11.0 zpqd 
c.Vegetable . .  3.8 8.8 9.9 9.8 9.0 9 4  ~47.4 
d Fodder . . . . . 2.1 7.1 8.6 10.6 10.6 14.1 611.1 
* A  hectare equals 2.47 acres. 
&! This means that our agriculture is becoqing more high- + 
grade and productive, and that a solid foundation is being : 
provided for the increasing, application of proper crop rotation. 
The way our collective farms and state farms have been 
$$ increasingly supplied with tractors, harvester combines ' and 
8;: L i G  4 other machines during the period under review in shown by 
the follow in^ tables: 
If, L addition. to these figures, we bear in mind that in the 
period under review the number of machine and tractor sta- 
tions increased from n;goo in 1934 to 6,350 in 1938, it may 
be safely said that the reconstruction of our agriculture on 
the basis of a new and up-to-date machine technique has in 
the main already been completed. 
Our agriculture, consequently, is not only run on the largest . 
and most mechanized scale in the world, and therefore pro- 
duces the largest surplus for the market, but is also more fully , 
equipped with modern machineiy than the agriculture of 
any other country. 
If we compare the harvests of grain and industrial crops 
during the period under review with the pre-revolutionary 
period, we get the following picture of growth: 
CROSS PRODUCTION OF GRAIN AND INDUSTRIAL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R. 
A 
'913 . '934 "935 '936 1937 1938 Bsg 
In millions of centners :a 235 
Grain . . . . . . . . 801.0 894.0 901.0 827.3 1,202.9 949.9 118.6 
Raw cotton . . . 7.4 11.8 17.2 23.9 25.8 26.9 363.5 . 
Flax fiber : . . . . 3.3 5-3 5.5 5.5 5.7 5-46 165-5 
Sugar beet . . . .  109.0 119.6 162.1 168.3 218.6 166.8 153.0 
Oil seed . . . . . . 21.5 36.9 42.7 42.3 51.1 46.6 216.7 
From this table it can be seen that despite the drought in 
the eastern and southeastern districts in 1936 and 1938, and 
despite the unprecedentedly large harvest in 1913, the gross 
production 'of grain and industrial crops during the period 
under review steadily increased as compared with 191 9. 
Of particular interest is the question of the amount of grain 
marketed by the collective and state farms as compared with 
their gross harvests. Comrade Nemchinov, the well-knowni 
statistician, has calculated that of a gross grain harvest of 
g,ooo,ooo,ooo poods* in pre-war times, only about ~,goo,ooo,- 
ooo poods were marketed. Thus the proportion of marketed 
* A pood is equal to 3i:i 13 pounds. 
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01 grain farming at that time was 26 per cent. Com- 
rade ~emchinok computes that the proportion of marketed 
podnce to gross harvest in the years ign6-27, for example, 
I 
was about 47 per cent in the case of collective and state farm- 
ing, which is large-scale farming, and about 12 per cent in -: 
the case of individual peasant farming. If we approach the I matter more cautiously and assume the amount of marketed 
produce in the case of collective and state farming in 1938 to 1 
be 40 per cent of the gross harvest, we find that in that year - 1  
our socialist grain farming was able to release, and actually 
did release, about o,goo,ooo,ooo poods of grain for the market, 
times. 
Consequently, the high proportion of produce marketed 
or i,ooo,ooo,ooo poods more than was marketed in pre-war 
constitutes the most important feature of state and collective 
farming, and is of cardinal importance for the food supply 
of our country. 
It is this feature of the collective farms and state farms that 
explains the secret why our country has succeeded so easilyc 
and rapidly in solving the grain problem, the problem of pro-,&% 
ducing .an adequate supply of market grain for this vast 
country. 
It should M noted that during the last three years. our 
annual state grain collections have not dropped below 1,600,-, 
ooo,ooo poods, while sometimes, as for example in 1987, they 
have reached 1,8oo,ooo,ooo poods. If we add to this another 
.~oo,ooo,ooo p d s  or so of grain purchased annually by the' 
state, as well as several hundred million poods sold by col- 
lective farms and farmers directly in the market, we get in all 
the total of grain marketed by the collective farms and state; 
farms already mentioned. 
Further, it is interesting to note that during the last three 
years the base of market grain has shifted from the Ukraine, 
which was formerly considered the granary of our countv, to 
the north and the east, that is, to the R.S.F.S.R.* We know 
+ Russian Soviet Federative Social~st Republic. 
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that during the last two or three years grain collections in I 
Ukraine have amounted in all to about 400,000,000 p m  
annually, whereas in the R.S.F.S.R. the grain collections du 
ing these years have amounted to i,ioo,ooo,ow or 1,200,000,~ 
000 poods an nu all^ -. A7c,?v ;:+: :$k 
That is how things stand with regard to grain farming. Y-:%"- 
As regards livestock farming,. considerable progress h f l  
been made during the past few years in this, the most back- 
ward branch of agriculture, as well. True, in the number of & horses and in sheep breeding we are still below the pre-revolu- 
8; tionary level; but as regards cattle and pig breeding we have already passed the pre-revolutionary level. 
- $  ,-",.?ti gr $;a bI5? Here are the figures: 
g; 
'AS- TOTAL HEAD OF LIVESTOCK 1N THE U.S.S.R. 5,+-'' 
, goats.. 1 ~ 1 . z  50.2 51.9 61.1 73.7 81.3 102.5 84.6 tq.~ 
&&.Pigs . . .  20.9 19.1 17.4 rr.5 30.5 22.8 30.6 ,464 252.9 
ere can be no doubt that the lag in horse breeding an 
<.:*,* j, 
breeding will be remedied in a very short period. . .-. .: 
Trade and transport. The progress in industry and' agrie 
e was accompanied by an increase in the trade of the 
country. During the period under review the number of state 
and cooperative retail trade increased by 178 per cent. Tr?$g._ 5 
$ in the collective farm markets increased by i 12 per cent. ,,, L$ 
w Here is the corresponding table: , .?'$ a .  
TRADE 
- 
markets (in millions of . 
rubles) . . . . . . 11,r;oo.o 14,000.0 14,500.0 : - c-L .4 17,799.7 2Qy3W.8 P1g-P I 
public catering (in miF 
lions of rubles) . : 49.73.2 61,814.7 81,718.1 106,760.9 1251943.8 138,574.3 ' 8786 
9. Trade in collective bdn 
- - - 
4. ~egional wholesale de- 
partments of the Peo- . - -  
pie's Commissariats of t 
Light Industry, ~ e a q  
Industry, Timber In- 
dustry, and Local In- 
dustry of the Union 
ihe Food Industry, 
~ep6blics-at end of 
year . . . . . . . 718 836 1,141. 1,798 1,912 1,994 87747 . - 
:, 2 % 
, and in 1938, it is to be 
in water-borne freight as comp 
, FREIGHT TRAFFIC 
, Railways (in bil- 
lions of ton-  
kilometers) . . . . 
River and marine 
tramport (in bil- 
liuns of ton- ' 
kilometers) . . . . 
6vil air fieet (in 
, - millions of ton-, 
kilometers) . . . . 
There can be no doubt that the lag in water tramport ih 
. 1938 will be remedied in 1989. 
I 
. 2.  FURTHER RISE M THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF 
I , T9E PEOPLE r 
i , 
The steady progress of industry and agriculture could no< 
, but lead, and has actually led, to a nav rise in the material 
and cultural standard of the people. ' The abolition of exploitation and the consolidation of the ', , ,. 
+. : socialist economic system, the absence of unemployment, with , .  , 
4 
its attendant poverty, in tawn and country, the enormous iz{ # .  8 :  
. expansion of industry and the' steady growth in the number ;& - <  of workers, the increase in the productivity of labor of the $,$ 
, workers and collective fmers,  the securement of the land 4 $y 
, to the collective farms in perpetuity, and the vast number of ;'.,? 
, --class tractors and agricultural machines supplied to the . 
= i 7 collective farms-all this has created effective conditions for a 
4 - ,  -. - - , >.?I* --Y;,-! +<y 
, . 
ideable force in our country and serve the interests of .! 
the mrkers and the peasants. - 
Now it is no longer a question of finding room in industry for 3 
unemployed and homeless peasants who have been set adrift - 
' fnnn their villages and live in fear of s t a r v a t i k f  giving 
'them jobs out of charity. The time has long gone by when -: 
, there were such peasants in our country. And this is a good , 
: thing, of course, for it testifies to the prosperity of our country- ! 
' side. If anything, it is now a question of asking the collective , 
, , farms to comply with our request and to release, say, one and :: 
: a half million young collective farmers annually for the needs,, , 
' a of out. expanding industry. The collective 'farms, which have 
already become prosperous, should bear in mind that if we 
, - do not get this assistance from them it will be very difficult . 1 
I . to continue the expansion of our industry, and that if we do 
- , not expand our industry we will not be able to satisfy the 
k - peasants' growing demand for consumers' goods. The collec- ' 
tive fanns are quite able to meet this request of ours, since 
' 
the abundance of machinery in the collective farms releases ,' 
, a portion of the rural workers, who, if transferred to industry. -; 
could be of immense service to our whole national economy. , . 
: As a result, we have the following indications of the im- ' 
* provement in the standard of living of the workers and peas- 
- ants during the period under review: 
I. The national income' rose from 48,1joo,ooo,oo~ rubles : 
in 1933 to 105,ooo,ooo,ooo rubles in 1938; 
2. The number of workers and other employees rose - from a little over 22,ooo,ooo in 1933 to z8,ooo.o~ in 1938; 
a1 annual payroll of workers and other em- 
e from g~,grj~,ooo,ooo rubles to g6,4~~,ooo,ooo 1: 
I 
e average annual wages of industrial workers, 
,., which amountcd to 1,513 rubles in 1933, rose to 3,447 4 
' *  mblesin19~8; =.- 
t d  monetary incomes of the collective farms ; 
~661,gw,ooo rubles in 1933 to i~,~80yioo,ooo 
rubles in 1937; , +. 
6. The average amount of grain received per collective 
1 
\ 
I \ - , - !. < . . .  5 
ousehold in th~9&ain-$iowin~$egio%! rose f a  61
in 1983 to 144 pods  in 1937, exclusive of seed, 
ergency seed stocks, fodder for the collectively-owned 
and payments in kind for work 
ine and tractor stations; 
priations for social and culturhl 
goo,ooo rubles in. 1933 to 35,202,- 
h 
standard of the pepple, its rise w 
commensurate with the rise in the standard of living. 
the cultural devklopment of 
people, the period under review. has been marked by a veri- 
table cultural revolution. The introduction bf universal com- 
pulsory elementary education in the languages of the various 8 nations of the U.S.S.R., an increasing number of schools and t! itudents of all grades, an increasing number pf college-trained 3 B 
experts, and the creation and growth of a new intelligentsia, $ 
a soviet intelligentsia-such is the general picture of the cyl.-b$ 
ral advancement of our people. -':i, $3 
i p s  4 Here are the figures: $ ?%i;? +F;- 
$>iff=? 
f >  I .  RISE IN THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE ; *,,G$ 
'74 4 
unit of 1938-39 ? compared 5 
measure- 1 933-34 with # 
ment 193~-39 1933.34 1 (per cent) 
of pupils and students , . , A  .q 'r ,,*ri:*,f:$$ 
E all mades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . thousands os,814 ss.djs.4 142.6 Lkk 
%; $ Secondary - (general and special). " 5,48n.2 r~ ,o~6 .0  220.~ 
$?  umber of persons engaged in all 
% - '  forms of study in the U3.S.R.. 4 4  - 47442.1 
$6 - "p3 
!$ Number of public libraries . . . . 4' .&:; 40.3 70.0 173.7 <$.? 
$2 Number of books in public ik. 
$%,Number of clubs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . thousands 
k! 61;1 95.6 i5(i.$$ 
$,Number of theatres . . . . . . . . . . . units 587 790 lS4.6 
'3  umber of cinema installations h: 
Wf& sound equipment ... 
: ; I  ' 
Number of cinema installations -3: 
Of which: 
With sound equipment 
u 
46 ........ 
Annual newspaper circulation. . millions 4,984.6 7,0994 140.3 
@ 2- NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BUILT IN THE U.S.S.R. IN 1933-38 a 
t i  - - Total (193"") .......... 4,254 l69353 20,601 
3. 'YOUNG SPECIALISIS GRADUATED FROM HIGHER EDUCATION 
i!2 IN~~TUTIONS IN 1933-88 
'933 '934 '935 '936 , '937 ' 193s 
Total for USS.R. (exclusive of . Thousands 
w.,w 
0. Engineers for transport and 
.......... communications 1.8 4.0 7.6 6.6 7.0 6.1.. 
3. Agricultural engineers, agron- 
omis ts, veterinarians and 8" a zoo-technicians ........... 4.8 6.3 8.8 104 11.3 10.6 
4 Economists and jurists .... n.5 2.r; 5.0 6 4  5.0 5.7 
5. T e a c h.e rs of secondary 
schools, workers' faculties, 
- technical schools, and other 
educational workers. includ- 
- . V  .. V *u-- , 
7. other specialists . . . . . . . . . . .  4.3 11.1 12.7 14.0 9.9 98 
As a ~esult of this immense cultural work a numerous new, . $ 
Soviet intelligentsia has a h e n  in our country, an intelligentsia 
wbich has emerged from the ranks of the working dass. peas- - 
antry and Soviet employees, which is of the flesh and blood d 
our people, which has never known the yoke of exploitation- 
which hates exploiters, and which is ready to serve the peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. faithfully and devotedly. 
I think that the rise of this new, socialist intelligentsia of 
the people is one of the most important results of the hltural 
revolution in our country. 
3. FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM 
. One of the most important results of the period under re- 
view is that it has led to the further internal consolidation of 
the country, to the further consolidation of the Soviet system. 
Nor could it be otherwise. The firm establishment of the 
socialist system in all branches of national economy, the prog- 
ress of industry and agriature, the rising material standard 
of the people, the rising cultural standard of the people and 
their increasing political activity-all this, accomplished under 
the guidance of the Soviet power, could not but lead to the 
further consolidation of the Soviet system. 
The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any 
capitalist society is that it no longer contains antagonistic, 
hostile classes; that the exploiting classes have been eliminated, 
while the workers, pepants and intellectuals, who make up 
Soviet society, live and work in friendly collaboration. While 
capitalist society is tom by irreconcilable contradictions be- 
tween' workers and capitalists and between peasants and land- 
lords-resul ting in its internal instabili ty--Sovie t society, lib- 
erated from the yoke of exploitation, knows no such contra- 
dictions, is free of class conflicts, and presents a picture of 
friendly collaboration between workers, peasants and intel- 
lectuals. It is this community of interest which has formed the 
basis for the development of such motive forces as the moral 
and political unity of Soviet society, the mutual friendship of 
the nations of the U.S.S.R., and Soviet patriotism. It has also 
been the basis for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted 
.in November 1936, and for the complete democratization ~f 
dG 
the elections to the supreme organs of the country. 
As to the elktiom themselveg, key  were a magnificent dem- 
onstration of that unity of Soviet society and of that amity 
among the nagions of the U.S.S.R. which constitute the char- 
. acteristic feature of the internal situation of bur country. As 
we know, in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R. in December 1937, nearly ninety million votes, or 
98.6 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the Communist 
and non-Party bloc, while in the elections to the Supreme 
Soviets of the Union Republics in June 1938, ninety-two mil- 
lion votes, or 99.4 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the 
Coqmunist and non-Party bloc. 
There you have the basis of the stability of the Soviet sys- 
tem and the source of the inexhaustible strength of the Soviet - 
power. 
This means, incidentally, that in case of war, the rear and 
front of our army, by reason of their homogeneity and inher- 
ent unity will be stronger than those of any other country, a 
fact which people beyond our bordeh who love military con- 
flicts would do well to remember. 
' Certain foreign newspaper writers have been talking e e l  
to the effect that the purging'of the Soviet organizations of 
spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, 
Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin and other fiends 
has "shaken" the Soviet system and caused its "demoraliza- . 
tion." One can only laugh at such cheap drivel. How can the 
purging of Soviet organizations of noxious and hostile elements 
shake and demoralize the Soviet system? This Trotsky-Bu- 
.kharin bunch of spies, murderers and wreckers, who kowtowed 
to the foreign world, who were possessed by a slavish instinct 
to grovel before every foreign bigwig, and who were ready to 
enter his employ as spiesdthis handful of people who did not 
nnderstand that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from 
the fetters of capital, stands bead and shoulders above any 
high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capi- 
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' the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were held; In these ele 
I and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the?? 
elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union ~epublics were; ---4 held. In these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was cast;' 
for the Soviet power. Where are the symptoms of "demoraliza-i 
tion," we would like to know, and why was this "demorali;, 
zation" not reflected in the results of the elections? -I - , 
To listen to these foreign drivellers one would think that; 
if the spies, murderers and wreckers had been left at liberty$;$ 
to wreck, murder and spy without let or 'hindrance, the Soviet[.:- 
organizations would have been far sounder and stronger. ,-'. : 
(Laughter.) Are not these gentlemen giving themselves awayi.rX$f 
too soon by so insolently defending the cause of spies, mur-i?I 
derers and wreckers? 
Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out of spies;:$! 
murderers and wreckers from our Soviet organizations was$tj 
bound to lead,and did lead, to the further strengthening off;$+# 
these organizations? 
What, for instance, do the events at Lake Khasan show, if: 
not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers is the surest 
means of strengthening our Soviet organizations? 
iz =. 
# # # y $ q  
The tasks of the Party in the sphere of internal policy are: g;f# 
isr(d,i 
1. To. increase the progress of our industry, the rise of 
productivity of labor, and the perfectio 
nique of production, in order, having alread 
the principal capitalist countries in techniq 
tion and rates of industrial development, to 
economically as well in the next ten or fifte 
2. To  inrlease the progress of our agricul 
Iweeding so as to achieve in the next three qr four ye 
$.q.p-";ww ,CCC*,~"~+q 7t -? ,*) . ?. < 14 , ' . : ', 7 b e  ' . '  ' *v w;i' )"i' . s' r.-'*5 
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!~:5:,:( , , > .  -> uz,znnual grain harvest of eight billion pods, with an / 
+ .  \ J fr 
3 -?,  
awrage yield of 12 to 13 centners per hectare; an average ' 
= ; s , ,  - r  - increase in the harvest of industrial crops of 30-95 per 
. cent; and an increase in the number of sheep and hoes 
by loo per cent, of cattle by about 40 per cint, and Gf 
horses by about 35 per cent. 
3. To  continue to improve the material and cultural 
*standards of the workers, peasants and intellectuals. 
4. Steadfastly to 'carry into effect our Socialist Constitu- 
tion; to complete the democratization of the political life 
of the country; to strengthen the moral and political unity 
of So~iet society and fraternal collaboration among our, 
workers, easants and intellectuals; to promote the friend- 
ship of &e people of the U.S.S.R. to the utmost, ahd to 
develop and cultivate Soviet patriotism. 
' 
5. Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capital- 
ist world; to remember that the forEign espionage services 
will smuggle spies, murderers and wreckers into our coun- 
try; and, remembering this, to strengthen our socialist 
intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat - 
and eradicate the enemies of the people. 
111. Further Strengthening of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet union 
(Bolsheviks) 
ROM the standpoint ot the political line and day-today 
Fpractical work, the period under review was one of com- 
plete victory for the general line of our Party.-(Loud and pro- 
longed applause.) 
The principal achievements demonstrating the coFectness 
of the poli+ of our Party and the correctness of its leader- 
ship are the firm establishment of the socialist system in the 
entire national economy, the completion of the reconstruc- 
tion of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new tech- 
nique, the fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan in indw 
try ahead of time, the increase of the annual grain harvest to 
a level of seven billion poods, the abolition of poverty and 
unemployment, and the raising of the material and cultural 
standard of the people. 
In the face of these imposing achievements, the opponents 
of the general line of our Party, all the various "Left" and 
"Right" trends, all the Trotsky-Pyatakov and Bukharin- 
~Rykov degenerates were forced to creep into their shells, to 
tuck away their hackneyed "platforms," and to retreat into 
hiding. Lacking the manhood to submit to the will of the 
people, they preferred to merge with the Mensheviks, Sodalist- 
Revolutionaries and fascists, to become the tools of foreign 
espionage services, to hire themselves out as spies, and to ob- 
ligate themselves to hap  the enemies of the Soviet Union to 
dismember our country and to restore capitalist slavery in it. 
Such was the inglorious end of the opponents of the line of 
our Party, who finished up as enemies of the people. 
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gP When it had smashed the enemies of the people and purged ., 
,s;.', - -  . the Party and Soviet organizations of degenerates, the Party 
$,;I .. became still more united in its political and organizational . 
i.5 ' work and rallied even more solidly around its Central Com- ; .$ .- . I 
. 
mittee. (Stormy applause. All the delegates rise and cieer the , 
-. _. . 
$11 ,. 4. I 
speaker. Shouts of "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live ' 
k Comrade StalinP' "Hurrah for the Central Commtttee of our 
,I: . Party!") 
A , Let i s  examine the concrete facts illustrating the develop- 
*.+ ' 
A.J ment of the internal life of the Party and its organizational 
- and propaganda work during the period under review. 
) 
p'- 
;;< . I. MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY. 
5 1  . .  DMSION OE ORGANIZATIONS. CLOSER CONTACT BETWEEN THE 
q t  . LEADING PARTY BODIES A N D ~ ~ E  W ~ R K  OF THE LOWER BODIES h,  - 
i .  
I; 
The strengthening of the Party and of its leading bodies 
$ - 
F - 
during the period under review proceeded chiefly along two 
I lines: along the line of regulating the composition of the e. . 
:$8 A Party, ejecting unreliable elements and selecting the best ele- 
.' f -  * . .  ments, and along the line of dividing up the organizations, 
i reducing their size, and bringing the leading bodies~closer to 
- the concrete, day-to-day work of the lower bodies. 
by: 
Q 
There were 1,874,488 Party members represented at the 
F -  
Seventeenth Party Congress. Comparing this figure with the 
5)- 
PI.  
number of Party members represented at the preceding con- 
F. gress, the Sixteenth Party Congress, we find that in .the interval 
a;.'., C , between these two congresses 600,ooo new members joined the 
FP4 p&ty. The Party could not but feel that in the conditions 
- 
. prevailing in iggo-gg such a mass influx into its ranks was an 
I..+'=, ::- unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its membership. The ?-$; Party knew that its ranks were being joined not only by hon- k +  + , est and loyal people, but also by chance elements and career- 
f- -(
ists, who were seeking to utilize the badge of the P 
6': their own personal ends. 
The Party could not but know that its strength lay not only + 





quality of its members. This raised the question of regulating 
the co&position of the Party. It was dedded to continue the 
purge of Party members and candidate members begun in 
1933; and the purge actually was continued until May 1935. 
It was further decided to, suspend the admiision of new mem- 
bers into the Party; and the admission of new members ac- 
tually was suspended until September 1936, the admission of 
new members being resumed only on November 1, 1936. Fur- 
ther, in connection with the dastardly murder of Comrade 
Kirov, which showed that there were quite a number of sus- 
picious elements in the Party, it was dedded to undertake a 
verification of the records of Party members and an exchange 
of old Party cards for new ones, both these measures being com- 
pleted only in September 1936. Only after this was the admis- 
sion of new members and candidate members into the Party 
resumed. 
As a result of all these measures, the Party succeeded in 
weeding out chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile ele- 
ments, and in selecting the most staunch and loyal elements. 
I t  cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave 
mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might 
have been expected. Undoubtedly, we shall have no further 
need of resorting to the method of mass purges. Nevertheless, 
the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the 
,whole, were beneficial; The number of Party members repre- 
sented at this, the Eighteenth Congress is about 1,6w,ooo, 
which is 270,000 less than were represented at the Seventeenth 
Congress. But there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, 
it is all to the good, for the Party strengthens itself by clearing 
its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in 
membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality. 
That is a big achievement. 
As regards the improvement of the day-today leadership 
of the Party by bringing it closer to the work of the lower 
bodies and by making it more concrete, the Party came to the 
conclusion that the best way to make it easier for the Party 
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bdies to guide the organizations and to make the 
'. , itself concrete, alive and practical was to divide up 
&: izations, to reduce their size. This measure was adopted with , 
'I. regard both to the People's ~omkissariats and the adminis ' 5 
' 
trative organizations of the various territorial divisions, that - ,' 
is, the Union Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc. The ' 
result of the measures adopted is that instead of seven Union . 
Republics, we now have eleven; instead of fourteen People's , 
' Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. we now have thirty-four; instead ". 
, of seventy territories and regions we now have I 10; instead of 
I 2,559 urban and rural districts we now have 3,815. Corres: 
- pondingly, within the system of leading Party bodies, we now 
I 
have eleven central committees, headed by the Central Corn-. *. 
, mittee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), six territorial committees, 104 , - %  
', regional committees, thirty area committees, 2 12 city corn- , 
mittees, 336 city district committees, 5,479 d district com- 
I mi ttees and I I 3,060 primary Party organizations. 
! I  
It cannot be said that the division of organizations is al- ? '  
+ ready over. Most likely it will be carried further. But, how- 
ever that may be, it is already yielding good results both in , 
the improvement of the day-today leadership of the work and 
in bringing the leadership itself closer to the concrete work , 
I of the lower bodies. I need not mention that the division of 
organizations has made it possible to promote hundreds and 
thousands of new people to leading posts. 
'.That, too, is a big achievement. 
4 2. SELECTION, PROMOTION AND ALLOCATION OF CADRES 
The regulation of the composition of the Party and the . 
, 
bringing of the leading bodies closer to the concrete work of' 
, the lower bodies was not, and could not be, the only means of 
further strengthening the Party and its leadership. Another - 
. means adopted in the period under review was a radical ini. 
: .. provement in the training of cadres, a n  improvement in the . 
" work of selecting, promoting and allocating cadres and of ,: 
testing them in the process of work. - 
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The Party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the 
Party; and since our Party is in power, they also constitute 
the commanding staff of the leading organs of state. After 
a correct political line has been worked out and tested in 
practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the 
work of guiding the Party and the state. A correct political 
line is, of course, the primary and most important thing. But 
that in itself is not enough. A correct political line is not 
needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into 
effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, 
we must have cadres, people who understand the political 
line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are 
prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into 
practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and 
fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political line runs the 
risk of being purely nominal. 
And here arises the question of the correct selection of 
cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of new people, 
the correct allocation of &ires, and the testing of cadres by 
h r k  accomplished. 
What is meant by the correct selection of cadres? 
The correct selection of cadres does not mean just gather- 
ing around one a lot of assistants and subs, setting up an office 
and issuing order after order. (Laughter.) Nor does it mean 
ahsing one's powers, switching scores and hundreds of people 
back and forth from one job to another without rhyme or - 
reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." (Laughter.) 
The proper selection of cadres means: 
First, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and 
the state, treasuring them, respecting them. 
Second, knowing cadres, carefully studying their individual 
merits, and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities 
of a given worker are most likely to develop. 
Third, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising 
worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently "bother- 
ing" with such workers and accelerating their development. 
Fourth, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, 
' so as not to aUow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow 
stale. 
Fifth, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each 
feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to OW 
. common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable 
him to contribute, and that the general trend of the work 
of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the 
political line for the carrying out of which this allocation 
of cadres is designed. 
Particularly important in this respect is the bold and timely 
promotion of new and young cadres. It seems to me that our 
. people are ilot quite clear on this point yet. Some think that 
in selecting people we must chiefly rely an the old cadres. 
Others, on the contrary, think that we must chiefly rely on 
young cadkes. It  seems to me that both are mistaken. The 
. old cadres, of course, represent a valuable asset to h e  Party 
and the state. They possess wha~ the young cadres lack, 
namely, tremendous experience in leadership, a schooling in 
Marxist-Leninist principles, knowledge of affairs, and a ca- 
pacity for orientation. But, in the first place, there are never 
enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they 
are already partly going out of commission owing to the opera- 
tion of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old cadres are 
d e t i m e s  inclined to keep a too persistent eye on the pat, 
to ding to the past, to stay in the old rut and fail to observe 
the new in life: This is called -losing the sense of the nm. 
It is a very serious and dangerous shortcoming. 
As to the young cadre;, they, of course, have not the ex- 
perience, the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the 
capacity of orientation of the old cadres. But, in the first place, 
' 
. the young cadres constitute the vast majority; secondly, they 
are young, and as-yet are not subject to the danger of p ing  
out of commission; thirdly, they possess in' abundance the ' - 
sense of the new, which is a valuable quality in every Bolshe- 
vik worker; and, fourthly, they develop and acquire knowl- ; 
, l  
edge so rapidly, they press upward so eagerly, that t!le time 
is not far off when they will overtake the old fellox-s, take 
their stand side by side with them, and become a worthy 
replacement for them. Consequently, the thing is not whether 
to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, bul to steer 
for a combination, a union of the old and the young cadres 
in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the 
state. (Prolonged apploure.) 
. That is why we must boldly and in good time promote 
young cadres to leading posts. 
One of the important achievements of the Party during 
the peiiod under review in the manner of strengthening the 
Party leadership is that, when selecting cadres, it has success- 
fully pursued, from top to bottom, just this course of corn- 
, bining old and young workers. 
Data in the possession ok the Central Committee of the Party 
show that during the period under review the Party succeeded 
in promoting to leading state and Party posts more than five 
hundred thousand young Bolsheviks, members of the Party 
and people standing close to the Party, more than twenty per 
cent of whom were women. - L 
What is our task now? 
Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres, 
from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it 
to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level. 
This entails putting an end. to the division of the work of 
studying, promoting and selecting cadres among various de- 
partments and sectors, and concentrating it in one body. 
This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Cen- 
tral Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) and a corresponding cadres 
department in each of the republic, territorial and regional 
Party organizations. 
3. PARTY PROPAGANDA, MARXIST-LENINIST TRAINING OF PmTY 
MEMBERS AND PARTY CADRES 
There is still another sphere of Party, work, a very impor- 
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tant and very responsible sphere, in which the worK 
strengthening the Party and its leading bodies has been 
on during the period under review. I am refemng t 
propaganda and agitation, oral and printed, the work of train- 
ing the Party members arid the Party cadres in the spirit of 
Marxism-Leninism, the work of raising the political and 
theoretical level of the Party and its workers. . + ;,, 
1,. ) There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance 
of Party propaganda, of the Marxist-Leninist training of our 
people. I am referring not only to Party functionaries. I .am 
also referring to the workers in the Young Communist League, 
trade union, trade, cooperative, economic, state, educational, 
military and other organizations. The work of regulating the 
composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies 
closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organized 
satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating 
cadres may be organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if ' 
our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if  
the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, 
if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of 
these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account 
of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, , 
cease to understand the truth of our cause and are trans- . 
formed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and 
mechanically carrying out instructions from above-then our , 
entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must - 
*be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level 
and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any 
branch of state or Party work, the better and more fruitful 
will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of 
the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the , 
workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of . 
Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of dis- 
ruition and failure in the work, of the workers 
becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry 
their degenerating altogether. I # :  qk2, .$ 
It may be confidently stated that if we succeeded in training 
the cadres in all branches of our work ideologically, and in 
schooling them politically, to such an extent as to enable them 
' 
easily to orientate themselves in the internal and international 
situation; if wexucceeded in making them quite mature M m -  
ists-Leninists capable of solving the problems involved in the 
guidance of the country without serious error, we would have 
every reason to consider nine-tenths of our problems already 
settled.' And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have 
all the means and opportunities for doing so. 
The training and molding of our young cadres usually 
proceeds in some particular branch of science or technology, 
along the line of specialization. This is necessary and de- 
sirable. There is no reason why a man who specializes in 
medicine should at the same time specialize in physics or 
botany, or vice versa. But there is one branch of science which 
Bolsheviks in all branches of science are in duty bound to 
, know, and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, of 
the laws of social development, of the laws of development 
of the proletarian revolution, of the laws of development of 
socialist construction, and of the victory of communism. For 
a man who calls himself a Leninist cannot be considered a 
real Leninist if he shuts himself up in his specialty, in math: 
ematics, botany or chemistry, let us say, and sees nothing be- 
yond that specialty. A Leninist cannot be just a specialist in his 
favorite science; he must also be a political and social worker, 
keenly interested in the destinies of his country, acquainted 
with tbe laws of soda1 development, capable of applying these 
laws, and striving to be an active participant in the political 
guidance of the country. This, of course, will be an additional . 
burden on specialists who are Bolsheviks. But it will be a 
burden more than compensated for by its results. 
The task of Party propaganda; the task of the Marxist- 
Leninist training of cadres, is to help our cadres in all 
branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist 
science of the laws of social development. 
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Measures for improving the work of propaganda and ( 
the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres have been discussed! 
many times by the Central Committee of the Communist' 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) jointly with propa- 
id gandir ts from various regional Party organizations. The pub- 
2. 
@ lication, in September, 1938, of the History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (BoLrheviks)iShort Course-wasl 
in this connection. It was ascertained that1 
of the Histo y of the C.P.S.U. (B)  had 
Marxist-Leninist propaganda in our country.! 
work of the Central Committee of the] 
been published in its decision, "On thel 
of Party Propaganda in Connection with the1 
the Histo y of the C.P.S.U.(B.)-Short Course/"' 
of this decision and with due reference to: 
- ," - * propaganda by lectures; 
' 3. To organize one-year Courses of Instruction for o 
lower cadres in each regional center; . qi A l . ~  - . : >: ;< 
: , .  , A , .  
$$?{C.P.S.U. (B.) of March, 1937, "On Defects in Party work,": $2 the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) has outlined the! 
&>..!following major measures for eliminating the defects in Pany 
t$? propaganda and improving the work of Marxist-Leninist 
@$Id training of Party members and Party cadres: R;;.; - 
.M, 
!,:pa . 
1. To concentrate the work of Party ~ r o ~ w a n d a  
- - -  
&,"I: 7r. ism-Leninism by Party memders to Ge moie 
st,. -.. to center the attention of the Party on propagand 
thrqvgh the press and on the organization of a system 03 
I 
To organize two-year Lenin Schools for our middle 
in various centers of the countiy; 
5. T o  organize a Higher School of Marxism-Leninism 
under the auspices of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U. (B.) with a threeyear course for the training: 
of highly qualified Pvty theoreticians; 
6. To  set up one ear Courses of Instmition for propa- 
wdis ts  and lourn&sts in various parts of the country; 
7. To set up in connection with the Higher School of 
Manrim-Leninism six-mon th Courses of Instruction for 
teachers of Marxism-Leninism in the higher educational 
establishments. 
There can be no douh that the realization of these mea- ' 
sures, which are already being carried out, although not yet 
sufficiently, will soon yield beneficial results. 
4. SOME QUESTIONS OF THEORY 
. Another of the defects of our propagandist and ideological 
work is the absence of fuil W t y  among our comrades on 
certain theoretical questions of vital practical importance, the 
existence of a certain amount of confusion on these questions. 
I refer to the question of the state in general, and of our 
sodalist state in particular, and to the question of our Soviet 
intelligentsia. 
It  is sometimes asked: We 'have abolished the exploiting 
classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the countq 
there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for 
the state; it must die away. Why then do we not help our 
sodalist state to die away? Why do we not strive to put an 
end to it? Is it not ,time to throw out all this rubbish of 
state?" 
Or further: "The exploiting classes have already been 
abolished in our country; socialism has been built in the main; 
we are advancing towads communism. NOW, the Marxis* 
doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state unde: 
communism. Why then do we not help our socialist state t 
die away? Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum 
of - antiquities?" 
These questions show that those who ask them have con. 
scientiously memorized certain propositions contained in the 
doctrine of Marx and Engels about the state. But they also 
show that these comrades have failed to understand the essen- 
tial meaning of this doctrine; that they have failed to realize 
in what historical conditions the various propositions of this 7 
doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that they do not 
unden tand presentday international conditions, have over- . 
looked the capitalist encirclement and the dangers it entails 
for the socialist country. These questions not only betray an 
underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an 
underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois 
states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers 
into our country and are waiting for a favorable opportunity 
to attack it by armed force. 
They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and 
significance of our socialist state and of its military, punitive 
and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defense 
of the socialist land from foreign attack. It must be confessed 
that the comrades mentioned are not the only ones to sin in 
this underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, ali of us without 
exception, sin to a certain extent in this respect. Is it not 
surprising that we learned about the espionage and con- 
spiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and Bukharini te leaders 
only quite recently, in 1937 and 1938, although as the evidence 
shows, these gentry were in the service of foreign espionage 
organizations and carried on conspiratorial activities from 
the very first days of the October Revolution? How could we 
have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we to explain 
this blunder? The usual answer to this question is that we 
could not possibly have assumed that these people could have 
fallen so low. But that is no explanation, still less is it a 
justification; for the blunder was a blunder. 
How is this blundy to be explained? It is to be explained 
by an underestimation of the strength and consequence of 
the mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us and of 
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their 'espionage organs, which endeavor to take advantage of 
people's weaknesses, their vanity, their slackness of will, to 
e ~ G s h  them in their espionage nets and use them to surroud 
the organs of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an 
underestimation of the role and significance of the mech- 
anism of our socialist state and of its intelligence service, by 
lan underestimation of this intelligence service, by the twaddle 
that an intelligence service in a Soviet state is an unimportant 
trifle, and that the Soviet intelligence service and the Soviet 
state itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum of 
antiquities. 
What could have given rise to this underestimation? 
It arose owing to the fact that certain of the general proposi- 
tions in the Marxist doctrine of the state were incompletely 
worked out and inadequate. It received currency owing to 
our unpardonably heedless attitude to matters pertaining to 
the theory of the state, in spite of the fact that we have twenty 
years of practical experience in matters of state which provide 
rich material for theoretical generalizations, and in spite of 
the fact that, given the desire, we have every opportunity of 
successfully filling this gap in theory. We have forgotten 
Lenin's highly important injunction 'about the theoretical 
duties of Russian Marxists, that it is their mission to further 
develop the Marxist theorg. This is what Lenin said.in this 
connection: 
"M7e do not regard Marxist theory as something com- 
pleted and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced 
that it has only laid the cornerstone of the science which 
socialists must further advance in all directions if they 
wish to keep pace with life. \Ve think that an indepen- 
dent elaboration of the Marxist theory is especially es- 
sen tial for Russian socialists, for this theory provides only 
general gu id ing principles, which, in particular, are 
applied in England differently from France, in France 
' diff eren t I y from Germany, and in Germany differently 
' from Russia." * 
V. I. Lenin, Collected' Works, Vol. 11, p. 492, Russian ed. 
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1 -. Consider, for example, the classical formulation of the 
, 
t h e o ~  of the development of the socialist state given by 
Engels: 
"As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be 
held in. subjection; as soon as, along with class domination 
and the struggle for individual existence based on the 
former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses 
arising from these have also been abolished, there is noth- 
ing more to be repressed which would make a special re- 
pressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which 
the state really comes forward as the representative of 
society as a whole-the taking possession of the means of 
production in the name of society-is at the sitme time 
its last independent act as a state. The interference of 
the state power in social relations becomes superfluous 
in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The 
government of persons is replaced by the administration 
of things and the direction of the process of production. 
The state is not 'abolished,' it withers away."* 
Is this proposition of Engels' correct? 
Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions: (1) if wb 
study the socialist state only from the angle of the internal 
development of the country, abstracting ourselves in advance 
from the international factor, isolating, for the convenience 
of investigation, a e  country and the state fnrm the interna- 
national situation; or (d) if we assume that socialism is already 
victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, 
that a socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist en- 
circlement, that there is no more danger in foreign attack, 
and that there is no more need to strengthen the army and 
< the state. 
h Well, but what if socialism has been victorious only in one 
country, and if, in view of this, it is quite impossible to 
I 
abstract oneself from international condi tions--what then? 
~ n ~ e l s '  formula does'not furnish an answer to this question. 
As a matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this question? 
I Frederick Engels, H e n  Eugen Duehring'r Revolution in S c i m c  [Anti- 
Duehring], pp. 308-9. International Publishers, N k  York. 
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+, ; - ' i d  therefore could not hwe given an answer to it. E~&IS $8 . w- 
' 'i' 
proceeds from the assumption that socialism has already W n  , .:hi: 
It3 
victorious in -all countries, or in a majority of countries, more ,,.?-,; 
I or less simultaneously. Consequently, Engels is not here in- "' 
vestigating any specific socialist state of any particular country, ' ' 
* but the development of the socialist state 'in general, on the ::,! 
assumption that socialism has been victorious in a majority ,. 
of countries-according to the formula: "Assuming that so- 
cialism is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes 
* t 
must the proletarian, socialist state undergo?" Only this gen- 
eral and abstract character of the problem can explain why s ,  
in his investigation of the question of the socialist state Engels -: 
completely abstracted himself from such a factor as intema- .! 
- tional conditions, the international situation. 
r t -But it follows from this that Engels' general formula about 
u1 
the destiny of the socialist state in general cannot be extended 
to the partial and specific case of the victory of socialism in 
one country only, a country .which is surrounded by a capitalist !" 
I' 
world, is subject to the menace of foreign military attack, 
cannot therefore abstract itself from the international situa- , i 
. - tion, and must have at its disposal a well-trained army, well- : 
organized punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service- + ,  
I consequently, must have its own stat% strong enough to de- .. ' 
fend the conquests of socialism from foreign attack. 
We have no right .to expea of the classical Marxist writers, 
-. separated as they bere from our day by a period of forty-five ..). 
, 'or fifty-five years, that they should have foreseen each and . 
every zigzag of history in the distant future in every separate 
- country. It would be ridiculous to expect that the classical ' . 
'Marxist writers should have elaborated for our benefit ready- 
' 
made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that ' . 
might arise in. any particular country fifty or one hundred 
:years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the classical 
! 
Marxist writers, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch 
. ready-made solutions. (General laughter.) But we can and 
, should expect of the Marxists-Leninists of our day that they , ' 
' 't. 
-c . m; .,-*y"I=j,~:*-A& *TT;;hpkT .;, j. ~ 5 %  , ,, ;F. :\: c, - 
do not confine themselves to learning by rote'? f 
tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the essence 
Marxism; thqt they learn to take account of the experi 
gained in the twenty years of existence of the socialist s 
in our country; that, lastly, they learn, with the use of 
experience and with knowledge of the essence of Marx 
to apply the varioi 
lend them greater 
his famous book, State and ~ e v o L t i o n ,  in August, 1 
that is, a few months before the October Revolutiog and 
.establishment of the Soviet state. Lenin considered it 
main task of this book to defend Manc's and Engels' doctrin 
of the state from &e distortions and vulgarizations of the o 
portunists. Lenin was preparing to write a second volume o 
State and Revolution, in which he intended to sum u 
the principal less01 
tions of 1905 and 
intended in the second volume of his book to elaborate and8 
develop the theory 
gained during the 
Death, however, prevented him from carrying this task in 
execution. But what Lenin did not manage to do should 
done by his disciples. (Loud applause.) 
The state arose be$use society split up into an 
classes; i t  arose in order to keep in restraint the 
majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The 
strupients of state authority have been mainly concentra 
in the army, the punitive organs, the espionage service, 
prisons. Two basic functions characterize the activity of the 
state: at home (the main function), to keep in restraint the 
exploited majority; abroad (not the main function), to extend 
the temtory of its class, the ruling class, at the expense of 
the temtory of other states, or to defend the territory of its 
own state from attack by other states. Such was the case in 
slave society and under feudalism. Such is the case unde 
capitalism. 
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. In order to overthrow capitalism it was not only necessary 
to remove the bourgeoisie from power, it was not only neces- 
sary  to expropriate the capitalists, but also to smash entirely :, 
the bourgeois state machine and its old army, its bureaucratic 
officialdom and its police force,. and to substitute for it a new, 
proletarian form of state, a new, socialist state'. And that, as we 
know, is exactly what the Bolsheviks did. But it does not 
follow that the new proletarian state may not preserve certain 
functions of the old state, changed to suit the requirements 
of the proletarian state. Still less does it follow that the forms 
of our socialist state must remain unchanged, that allfhe 
original functions of our state must be fully preserved in 
hture. As a matter of fact, the forms of our state are changing 
and will continue to change in line with the development of 
our country and with the changes in the international situa- 
tion. 
Lenin was absolutely right when he said: 
"The forms of the bourgeois state are extremely varied, 
but in essence they are all the same: in one way or an- 
other, in the last analysis, all these states are inevitably 
' the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from 
capitalism to communism will certainly create a great 
variety and abundance of political forms, but in essence 
there will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the 
proletariat."* 
Since the October Revolution, our socialist state has passed 
through two main phases in its development. 
The first phase was the period from the October Revolu- 
tion to the elimination of the exploiting classes. The principal 
task in that period was to suppress the resistance of the over- 
thrown classes, to organize the defense of the country against 
the attack of the interventionists, to restore industry and agri- 
culture, and to prepare the conditions for the elimination of 
* V. I. Lenin, "State and Revolution," Selected Works, Vol. VII, Inter- 
national Publishers, New York. 
the capitalist efkm~nts. Accordingly, in this period our state 
performed two main functions. The first function was td 
suppms -the overthrown clasp inside the country. In this 
respect our state bore a superficial resemblance to previous 
states whose functions had also'been to suppress recalcitrants, 
with the fundamental difference, however, that our state sup- 
pressed the exploiting minority in the interests of the laboring 
majority, while previous states had suppressed the exploited 
majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The sec- 
ond function w& to defend the country from foreign attack. 
In &is respect it likewise bore a superficial resemblance to 
previous states, which also undertook the armed defense of 
their.countries, with the fundamental difference, however, that 
our stake defended from foreign attack the gains of the labor- 
ing majority, while previous states in such cases defended the 
wealth and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state 
had yet a third function: this was the work of economic or- 
ganization and cultural education performed by our state 
bodies with the purpose of developing the infant shoots of the 
new, socialist economic system and re-educating the people 
in the spirit of socialism. But this new function did not attain 
to any considerable development in that period.. 
The second phase was the period from the elimination of 
the capitalist elements in town and country to the complete 
victory of the socialist economic system and the adoption of 
the new Constitution. The principal task in this period was 
to establish the socialist economic system all over the country 
and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist elements, 
to bring about a cultural revolution, and to form a thor- 
oughly modem anny for the defense of the country. And the 
the functions of our socialist state changed accordingly. The 
function of military suppression 'inside the country ceased, 
died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were 
no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. 
In place of this function of suppression the state acquired 
the function of protecting sodalist property from thieves and 
m- , &+( .q, a * -  - ,,# ,. - .  : ,z. ; 5 , 1.. 5,: b- j -3 j$ - -, 1 4 -  - .  , , - 8 , - , .. , ,LJ? \ ,  
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TJLkikrs +., of-& pGe*s ~roperty. ~ h c  function of defending .. . 
+'%be country from foreign attack fully remained; consequently, ,- ': 
?ih&ed Army and the Navy also fully remained, as did the . ; 
- punitive organs and the intelligence service, which are in- 
- '  ,dispensable for the detection and punishment of the spies, 
'' assassins and wreckers sent into our country by foreign espio- 
nage services. The function of economic organization and cul- 
tural .education by the state organs also remained, and was 
developed to the full. Now the main task of our state inside 
the, country is the work of peaceful economic organization 
and cultural education. As for our m y ,  punitive organs, ,. 
and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the 
inside of the country but to the outside, against external 
enemies. . 
As you see, we now have an entirely new, socialist state, ' 
without precedent in history and differing considerably in . 
form and functions from the socialist state of the first phase. 
But development cannot stop there. We are going ahead, 
towards communism. Will our state remain in the period of 
communism ' d o ?  
Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated; . 
and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disap 
peared. ~ a t u r a l l ~ ,  of course, the forms of our state will again 
change in conformity with the change in the situation at 
home. and abroad. 
No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the capitalist 
encirdemeht is liquidated and a socialist encirclement taka . 
its place. 
That is how the question stands with regard to the so&alist .' 
state. 
The second question is that of the Soviet intelligentsia. 
On this question, too, as on the question of the state, there 
is a certain. unclearness and confusion among Party members. ' - 
In spite of the fact that the position of the Party on the 
question of the Soviet intelligentsia is perfealy clear, there 
me still current in our Party views hostile to the Soviet intel- 
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incompatible with the Party As you' 
hold h e  false views practice a disdaiinhl .. . 
attitude to the Soviet intelligentsia and 
force, even as a force hostile to the work-, 
True, during the period of So- . 
I 6 -  .; . , viet development the intelligentsia has undergone a radical . 
, , change both in its coymsition and status. It has come closer 
' 
Y '  - to the people and is honestly collaborating with the people, 
+;. ' 
. , in which respect it differs fundamentally from the old, bour- " geois intelligentsia. But .this apparently means nothing to ' &- 
these comrades. They go 6n harping on the old tunes nnd 
1% mongly apply to the Soviet intelligentsia views and attitudes , . it - ', which were jurtfid in the ald days when the intelligentsia 
was in the service of the landowners and capitalists. 
P. . 
i:-, . 
. In tlre old days, under capitalism, before the revolution, the 
intelligentsia consisted primarily of members of the propertied id*- 
7: , .  - . dasm-nubleemen, manufacturers, merchants, kulala and so :,I 
, on Some membem of the intelligentsia were sons of small . : 
5. ' . , ,. . . aademkn, petty &uals, and even of. peasants and workiq- 
5 :: .- inen, but they did not and could not play a decisive part. . &'# ' The intelligentsia as a whole depended for their livelbod 
, on the propertied classes and ministered to the propertied , d, 
Ky classes; Hence it is easy to understand the'mistmst, often 8i 
P p' 
, biorciering on h a w  with which the revolutionary elements - 4 
7 , d our country and above all the workers regarded the in- y . ,  
, - #,&e@taah. TN~,  the old intelligmtdn produced some cour-- 
' 
rgeeur individd,  handfuls af revolutionaq people who 
doped the stanitpoint of the working dass and completely 
threw in their lot with the working dass. But such people were 
rll too few vnong #the intelligentsia, and they could not 
change thexomplexion of the intelligentsia as a whole. 
Matters with regard to the intelligentsia have undergonk a 
fundamental change, however, since the October Revolution,. 
since the defeat of the foreign armed intervention, and ape- 
. - dally s ina  the victory of industrialization and collect 
the abolition of exploitation and the firm esta 
, 
r .  
of the socialist economic system made it really possible to 
give the country a new constitution and to put it into effect, 
The most influential and qualified section of the old intelli- 
gentsia broke away from the main body in the very first days 
of the October Revolution, proclaimed war on the Soviet 
government, and joined the ranks of the saboteurs. They met 
with well-deserved punishment for this; they were smashed 
and dispersed by the organs of Soviet power. Subsequently 
the majority of those that survived were recruited by the 
enemies of our country as meckers and spies, and thus were 
expunged by their own deeds from the ranks of the intellec- 
tuals. Another section of the old intelligentsia, less qualified 
but more numerous, long continued to mark time, waiting 
for "better days"; but then, apparently giving up hope, de- 
cided to go and serve and to live in harmony with the Soviet 
government. The greater part of this group of the old intelli- 
gentsia are well on in years and are beginning to go out 
of commission. A third section of the old intelligentsia, 
mainly conuprising its rank and file, and still less 
qualified than the section just mentioned, joined forces with 
the people and supported the Soviet government. It needed 
to perfect its education, and it set about doing so in our uni- 
versities. But parallel with this painful process of differenti- 
ation and break-up of the old intelligentsia there went on a 
rapid process of formation, mobilization and mustering of 
forces of  a new intelligentsia. Hundreds of thousands of young 
people coming from the ranks of the working class, the 
peasantry and the working intelligentsia entered the univer- 
sities and technical colleges, from which they emerged to 
reinforce the attenuated ranlls of the intelligentsia. They in- 
fused fresh blood into it and reanimated it in a Soviet spirit. 
They radically changed the whole aspect of the intelligentsia, 
molding it in their own form and image. The remnants of 
the old intelligentsia were dissolved in the new, Soviet intelli- 
gentsia, the intelligentsia of the people. There thus arose a 
, new, Soviet intelligentsia, intimately bound up with the 
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peoplk and, for the most part, ready to serve them fait] 
and loyally. 
As a result, we now have a numerous, new, popular, socialist 
intelligentsia, fundamentally different from the old, .born 
p i s  intelligentsia both in composition and in social and - 
political character. 
The old theory about the intelligentsia, which taught that - 
it should be treated with distrust and combated, fully applied 
to the old, pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, which served the 
landlords and capitalists. This theory is now out-of-date and 
does not fit our. new, Soviet intelligentsia. Our new .intelli- . 
gentsia demands a new theory, a theory teaching the necessity j 
for a cordial attitude towards it, solicitude and respect for it, ' 
and cooperation with it in the interests of the working class 
and the peasantry. 
That is clear; 1 should think. 
It $ therefore all the more astonishing and strange that aft& 
all these fundamental changes in the status of the. intelli- 
gentsia people should be-found within our Party who attempt. ,,* 
to apply the old theory, which was directed against the bour- - ' ' j 
geois intelligentsia, to our neM Soviet intelligentsia, which - : 
is basically a socialist intelligentsia. These people, it appears, 
*sat. that workers and peasants who until recently were . $ 
working in Stakhanov fashion in the factories and collective * 
farms, and who were then sent to the universities to be edu-, 
a t e 4  thereby ceased to be reaI people and became second-rate 
people. So we are to conclude' that education is a pernicious 
and dangerous thing. (Laughter.) We want all our workers 
end peasants to be cultured and educated, and we shall 
achieve this in time. But in the opinion of these queer com- 
rades, this purpose harbors a grave danger; for after the wad- 
em and peasants become cultured and educated they may fat 
the danger of being classified as second-rate people. (Lou 
faetghter.) The possibility is not precluded that these quec 
qmrades may in time sink to the position of extolling 'b..-. 
dardness, ignorance, benightedness and obscurantism. :, 
' I '  
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. +odd be quite in the nature of things. Theoretical v1&ar*!: ,<  
. have never led, and never can lead, to any good. 
Such is the position with regard to our new, socialist 
telligentsia. I 
# # # 
Our tasks in respect to the further strengthening of the 
Party are: 
1. 'TO systematically imprive the composition of the 
Party, raising the level of knowledge of its membership, 
' and admitting into its ranks, by a process of individual 
selehtion, only tried and tested comrades who are loyal to 
the cause of communism. f 
2. To establish closer contact between the leading 
\ 
bodies and the work of the lower bodies, so as to make 
- their work of leadership more ractical and specific and 
. . less confined .to meetings and o k ces. 
3. To centralize the work of selecting cadres, to train 
' them carefully and foster them, to study the merits and 
a demerits of workers thoroughly, to promote young work- 
ers boldly and adapt the selection and allocation of cadres 
' to the requirements of the political line of the Party. 
4. To centralize Party propaganda and agitation, to 
extend the propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, 
and to raise the theoretical level and improve the political 
I schooling of our cadres! 
# # # 
Comrades, I am now about to condude my report. 
I bave sketched in broad outline the path traversed by our 
Pvty during the period under review. The results of the ;i 
-work of the Party and of its Central Committee' during this '+ 
* period are well known. There bave been mistakes and short- 
*. 
comings in our work. The Pacy and the Central Committee . 
.did not conceal them and strove to correct them; There have , 
I 
. 'also been important successes and big achievements, which 
. 
m y t  not be allowed to turn our heads.- ,. 
. The'chief condusion to be drawn is that the working dass . 
'of Qur country, having abolished the exploitation of man by 
- man and firmly established the socialist system, has proved to- 
\ 
theworld the truth of its cause. That is the chief conclusion, 
f& it strengthens our faith in the power of the working dass 
and in the inevitability of its ultimate victory. 
The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the people can- 
not get along without capitalists and landlords, without 
merchants and kulaks. The working class of our country has 
proved in practice that the people can get along without ex- 
ploiters perfectly well. 
The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that, having de- 
stroyed the old bourgeois system, the working dass is incapable 
of building anything new to replace the old. The working 
c h s  of our country has proved in practice that it is quite 
capable not only of destroying the old system but of building 
a new and better system, a socialist system, a system, m&e- 
over, to which crises and unemployment are unknown. 
The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the peasantry 
is incapable to taking the path of socialism. The collective 
farm peasants of our country have proved in practice that they 
can do so quite s~ccessfull~ 
The chief endeavor of the bourgeoisie of all countries and 
of its reformist hangers-on is to kill in the working class faith 
in its own strength, faith in the possibility and inevitability 
of its victory, and thus to perpetuate capitalist slavery. For 
the bourgeoisie knows that if capitalism has not yet been 
overthrown and still continues to exist, it has not itself to 
thank, but the fact that the proletariat has still not faith 
enough in the passibility of its victory. 1t cannot be said that 
the efforts ofthe bourgeoisie in this respect have been altogether 
pnsuccessful. It must be confessed that the bourgeoisie and its 
agents among the working class have to some extent succeeded 
in 'poisoning the minds of the working class with the venom 
of doubt and scepticism. If the successes of the working class 
of our count$ if its fight and victory serve to rouse the spirit 
of the working class in the capitalist countries and to 
strengthen its faith in its own power and in its victory, &en 
our Party may say that its wark has not been in vain. And 
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there need be no doubt that this will be the case. (Loud and 
' prolonged applawc.) 
Long live our victorious working clam! (Applau~c.) 
Long live our victorious collective farm peasantry! 
(Applause.) 
Long live our socialist intelligentsia! (Applause.) 
Long live the great friendship of the nations of our country! 
( A  Pplause.) I 
Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! 
(Applause.) 
(The delegates riie and hail Comrade Stalin with loud and 
stormy cheers. Cries of: "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" 
"Hurrah for our great Stalin!" "~urra 'h  for our beloved 
Stalin!") 
# # # 
After a four dayss dkeussion in which 37 -speakers partici 
pated the following resolution was unanimously adopted by 
the Congress consisting of about 2,000 delegates: 
r. T o  approve the political linr and the practical work 
of the Central Cowamrttee 01 the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. 
2. T o  approve the report of Comrade Stalin and to 
propose that the policies and tnsks advanced in the rpor t  
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